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Summary 
The principles for comparative experiments, Randomization, 
Stratification and Replication are critically reviewed in the light 
of a new view put forth by a prominent group of statisticians. They 
propose that trials should be large: randomization with regard to 
therapeutic agents be balanced; prior stratification on prognostic 
indicators be abandoned. 
It is concluded that if this advice is followed, clinicians 
will obtain interpretable results using fairly simple techniques, 
that can be convincing to fellow workers. But it is advised in 
this paper that important deviations are in order when a competent 
statistician is collaborating on the trial. In particular, a more 
intensive modeling of the experiment should be attempted; pre-
randomization stratification on key prognostic indicators be employed; 
P-value analyses be abandoned in favor of Bayes-factor analyses; a 
predictivistic approach be undertaken. 
* Invited address to the 16th Hoechst Medical Symposium on Analgesic, 
Anti-Rheumatic and Anti-Inflammatory Drugs held at Santa Barbara, 
California, June 2-4, 1980. 
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Introduction 
One of the difficulties in making inferences with respect to certain 
"measurable" clinical responses in highly complex biological organisms 
such as rats or man is the inherent variation atte~dent upon the adminis-
tration of almost any agent including those that have no claim to being 
anything but totally inactive. This has led to several principles useful 
in conducting experiments that attempt to sort out a muted signal in the 
presence of a good deal of,. if not overwhelming, noise. 
The principles, proposed by Fisher (1926) originally for comparative 
agricultural experiments, are Randomization, Stratification, and Replica-
tion. Stratifying variable units into more or less homogenous blocks or 
strata obviously is an error reducing device. Randomly allocating the 
treatments to the units within strata ensures, on the average, a fair com-
parison of the treatments with the precision of the comparison increasing 
with the number of replications. This is traditionally the statistical basis 
for experimental design as enunciated by Fisher-- all else is commentary. 
A Newly Received State of the Art or Advice to the Uniniated? 
A recent series of papers (Peto plus 9, 1976, 1977) should be required 
reading for all clinical investigators (and statisticians) even if only to 
take issue with certain suggestions contained therein. This product of a 
collaboration of a British-American Statistici Decemviri promotes 
* This work was supported in pa~t by NIH Grant 25271. 
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guidelines for the conduct of clinical trials based on certain statistical 
considerations. Amidst a plethora of sensible and illuminating advice, 
three major points emerge that are pertinent to the topic under discussion 
here: trials should be large; randomization with regard to therapeutic 
agents should be balanced; prior stratification on prognostic favors should 
not be used. The order in which these points are made is especially relevant. 
They argue t~at for a given number of patients and stipulated 
significance level the increase in power of a few large trials over many 
small ones, not only permits the detection of smaller differences, but 
also greatly restricts the number of misleading trials. They then con-
clude that at the least if a single large trial cannot be sustained for 
whatever reason, then it would be preferable that any series of small 
independently organized trials to assess similar questions be competently 
organized into a large collaborative trial. 
Another consequence of large trials, they claim, is the negligible 
increase in expected power if pre-randomization stratification were em-
ployed, as contrasted to its use in a small trial. The necessary 
logistical effort in achieving an appropriate stratification may also 
deter investigators from active cooperation in a trial. At any rate, 
patients may later be subdivided retrospectively into several relevant 
prognostic factors, so that sharp comparisons may be made within strata. 
Although prior stratification can automatically achieve the balance between 
the numbers assigned to each treatment, which for a small trial may be 
critical, a randomized large trial will on the average ensure that a 
reasonable balance is also attained. The expected increase in efficiency 
in attempting a pre-randomization stratification with complete balance 
is slight when compared to the potential risk attendent on losing a large 
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fraction of available patients because of lack of cooperation in imple-
menting a more complex trial. 
The utility of stratification, the assignment of patients into 
mutually exclusive reasonably homogenous classes defined by prognostic 
factors which are presumed to influence the response, is the enhancement 
of the sensitivity of the comparison between treatments. It may also 
serve to identify differential effects of the therapies with regard to 
prognostic factors. But they argue that unless both the trial and the 
number of strata are small there is no discernible advantage to a pre-
entry stratification as opposed to a retrospective stratification analysis. 
One note of caution -- this advice was proclaimed as intended for clini-
cians without statistical expertise who presumably design and analyze 
their own trials. It must be viewed as similar to advice a surgeon would 
give to a statistician who intended to lance his own boil, "If you use 
such and such a simple technique and take the following simple precau-
tions, the prognosis should be favorable." Of course if the surgeon him-
self were to operate, he would ordinarily use much more sensitive tools 
and techniques depending on a variety of circumstances. The thrust of 
the counsel is clearly to minimize potential damage while still providing 
relief. 
In a similar vein, the advice given by the Statistici Decemviri 
is -- if you conduct a large trial, and if you use balanced randomization 
with respect to the treatments, you will have an excellent chance of 
obtaining interpretable results using fairly simple statistical techniques. 
From this point of view, it is conservative but surely sound advice. Some stat-
isticians, Brown (i978a, 1978b), Pocock (1979), Simon (1979), have tended to 
look upon the Peto plus 9 paper as one advising them how to advise clinicians 
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with whom they were collaborating on a trial and as such have reacted, not 
without some irritation,by stressing the importance of stratifying on a few 
potentially important prognostic variables and adaptive balancing schemes. 
Large Trials 
All other things being equal, everyone would agree that a large trial 
is not only at least as informative as a small one, assuming both were 
conducted in the same manner, but more than likely much more so. All things, 
however, are hardly ever equal there are costs in time, money, and effort 
relative to the information to be ascertained which often must be 
taken into consideration in determining an appropriate size for an 
anticipated clinical trial. It is also of no small matter that the Peto 
plus 9 opus was primarily directed towards trials in Cancer, Heart Disease, 
Transplant Rejection, Thrombosis and other extremely serious diseases 
which study time to death or some other untoward event, clearly 
attributable to the disease. 
In less life threatening diseases one must more carefully consider 
adverse effects of a therapy which may be more threatening than the 
disease. The agent itself may promote an unwanted and possibly irreversible 
state in some fraction of the population at risk. Detection of and pro-
tection against such an eventuality is of considerable importance. The 
smaller the proportion so affected the larger a sample size necessary for 
its detection. Thus in trials of this kind, aside from the usual assessment 
of the benefit of the therapy as directed towards the disease, there is the 
potential for the emergence of far more serious consequences, which may 
virtually go undetected if only a small fraction are at risk,unless a 
reasonably large sample size is employed. 
'· 
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Randomization 
Why randomize? Seemingly cogent arguments are advanced. The esti-
mates of the critical parameters are unbiased and impartial with regard to 
selection factors. "Valid" estimates of error are obtained with which to 
gauge the estimation of the critical parameters. The physical act of 
randomization induces a distribution which can be used to qssess the 
significance of the result. A dividend so large from so small an invest-
ment requires an explanation. 
The usual schema for the statistical paradigm is a random sample from 
some specified population at large with some measured attribute often 
assumed approximately normally distributed. The basis for tests of 
significance and confidence intervals for the characteristics of the 
population under scrutiny rests on these assumptions. In this setup the 
physical act of randomly allocating the treatments to the units of the 
random sample serves merely to ensure an impartial trial in that a valid 
comparison can be made of the agents, unencumbered by conscious or un-
conscious selective bias. Although a haphazard allocation would theoreti-
cally serve just as well,it would not engender the degree of acceptability 
by others nor psychologically protect the experimenter against self-
deception. In clinical trials, however, this model is often an 
impossible scenario. It is generally very difficult if not impossible 
to draw a random sample from a well defined population that entirely 
encompasses the target of the therapy. And even if it were, the 
attribute may not be approximately normally distributed. In the 
absence of satisfying this model, randomization now plays a further 
crucial, if not controversial, role. It permits, for moderate to 
large sample sizes, the use of normal theory in calculating approximate 
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significance levels irrespective of the original underlying distribution. 
Further, in small samples exact significance levels may be determined without 
great difficulty by a permutation computation. This amply demonstrates the 
potency of the physical act of randomization according to its proponents. 
Even this powerful tool has limitations -- the statistical inference 
that results from the randomization test,whether calculated approximately 
or exactly is restricted to the individuals in the sample under hypotheti-
cally identical reruns of the trial. Only random allocation of the agents 
is permitted to vary while other factors are fixed at the levels assumed when 
the original trial was run. Such an inference is regarded by some as being 
of little or no import, Basu (1980). Advocates of randomization must now 
make an extra-statistical "logical" argument, by analogy for example, rather 
than a statistical inference to an interesting target population. Certainly, 
conclusions based on such reasoning do have a validity of their own in most 
instances. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that aspirin will differen-
tially effect SO-year-old arthritic females in 1980 as opposed to SO-year-old 
arthritic females in 1985 under similar circumstances. Nevertheless,awareness 
of the various types of arguments being marshalled in support of a conclusion 
by those totally connnitted to this use of randomization is illuminating. 
Sooner or later even they must switch into a subjective mode~ 
Stratification 
Randomization ensures that two agents that are balanced are equally 
administered, on the average, to the various categories of patients 
who enter the study. Clearly if the number of strata are more than 
modest, the on average guarantee of balance within each stratum may be 
illusory because of the greijt variability over sets pf such triAl~. So 
much so that being near the average in any single trial can be highly 
unlikely. For a fixed number of patients the probability of achieving 
balance or near balance in every stratum declines as the number 
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of strata increases. Mitigating this is the fact that,for a fixed number 
of strata,the possibility of near balance increases with the size of the 
trial. But nobody likes to be caught with his balance down. For large 
studies and few strata imbalance is unlikely. But it will occur with prescribed 
frequency, depending on the size of the trial and the number of strata,no 
matter how surprising it is that it occurred to us. And when it does it 
can inculcate a bias,as well as a loss of power for a particular trial --
though not on the average. Small comfort indeed is an unattained average. 
The possibility that an agent will exhibit specificity for particular 
prognostic factors, is always a possibility and sometimes a welcome one. 
More generally the differential response of the agents with respect to 
prognostic factors may vary considerably and could remain undetected or 
unaccounted for,unless balance is achieved within and even between strata. 
Such is the conventional wisdom which stresses the importance of prior 
stratification. 
The Statistic! Decemviri argue that the larger the number of strata and 
the closer the balance within and between strata, the larger the number of 
patients it is necessary to secure. As a consequence many patients may have 
to be turned away, especially if equal numbers are required for all strata. 
Quite often gaps may be filled only with great difficulty, or not at all. 
Indeed,the trial may become so involved and so expensive that it is useless 
to even attempt. Further, its analysis, which would be more complex because 
of the stratification, could be misleading unless this design feature is 
carefully taken into account. Again it is not very likely in a large trial 
that a particularly bad balance of agents would result from not stratifying 
prior to randomization for a few critical prognostic factors. Patients are 
easier to obtain, the trial is simpler and prognostic factors may be 
adjusted for after the trial. However, the latter proposal -- an analysis 
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based on retrospective stratification, is not held in as high repute and is 
thus less convincing than a prospective stratification. The controversy 
involves the potential incompatibility of the principles of conditionality 
and repetitive sampling, as well as the ambiguity insinuated into the in-
terpretation of significance levels and power by posterior data ransacking. 
A completely consistent resolution of these philosophical issues,within 
the confines of classical sampling theory,may be impossible to achieve. 
Because a crucial objective of a trial is to obtain a clear cut evaluation 
which is persuasive not only to the conductors of the trial but to fellow 
scientific workers and clinicians, prior stratification is certainly the 
safer course, if a trial is not large. 
McHugh (1980) has attempted to sort out estimators and their variances 
for pre-and post-stratification designs. He regards the virtue of his 
effort as enabling one to plan an appropriate prior stratification strategy 
on the basis of the anticipated relative precision of the estimators. An 
unsettling feature of such analyses is that if the same configuration of 
patients, treatments, etc. is achieved by a balanced restricted randomiza-
tion implicit in prior stratification, as obtained merely by an overall 
balanced randomization then the analyses would differ, for identical data. 
McHugh also demonstrates that as the sample size increases, the analyses 
would tend to be the same, lending credence to large post-stratification. 
It is my impression that at least some of the Statistici Decemviri, though 
frequentists all, were disturbed or disagreed sufficiently about such 
possibilities that they neatly finessed the issue by advocating large 
trials, thus ensuring that discrepancies due to such anomalies would 
negligibly, or not at all, influence any important conclusions for the 
anticipated few retrospective strata that would require scrutiny. 
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Further Comments And Other Stuff 
Much has been claimed for the physical act of randomization e.g. 
Kempthorne (1977) -- it deals with the inability to obtain a random sample 
from a target population it dispenses with restrictive distributional 
assumptions -- it avoids or negates selection bias -- it provides valid 
estimates of error -- it enables the generation of informative significance 
levels. Others allege these benefits are either illusory, Harville (1975) 
or illogical, Basu (1980) -- the former arguing in the frequency mode and 
the latter from a Bayesian viewpoint. Harville proposes that considerably 
more modeling of the setup either from a design standpoint or from a 
knowledge of covariates is the appropriate avenue. In a frontal assault, 
Basu argues that randomization glosses over much information that one 
neglects at one's peril while other Bayesians such as Jeffreys (1939) 
insist that sample space notions upon which randomization rests are not 
compelling. Indeed, why reject a hypothesis because it has not predicted 
observable results that have not occurred? This is better known as the 
"tail area syndrome." There is also that well known conundrum that the 
more control (in terms of information brought to bear on the issue) a 
scientist exerts on his experiment, the less scope for randomization. 
This results in a proportionate diminution of the number of elements in 
the sample space which has the direct consequence (in extremis) of rendering 
a test incapable of rejecting a false hypothesis at an appropriate significance 
level. Sample space theorists (frequentists) regard this as irremediable, and 
counsel limits to the control of an experiment, while Basu and other Bayesians 
regard such a view as unscientific and illogical. Contrarily, frequentists 
consider the Bayesian view as unrealistic and held by individuals who either 
do not conduct experiments or conduct them only to convince themselves. The 
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personalistic outlook is not reasonable, they maintain, for those who conduct 
"public" experiments; i.e. to instill conviction or confidence amongst 
peer groups in the conclusions drawn from an experiment. 
A more enlightened,if not regal,Bayesian view espoused by Cornfield 
(1976) also denies that the sample space induced by randomization is 
cogent for inference and decision, but perceives randomization as one of 
several possible ad hoc devices to achieve comparability between treat-
ment groups which come under the heading of "rexing" -- rendering prior 
distributions exchangeable. 
What then is the empirical evidence concerning the value of randomiza-
tion? Mosteller (1977) infers support indirectly for randomized trials 
from some 53 non-randomized clinical trials, controlled to a greater or 
lesser extent, of the portacaval shunt operation. He correlates the 
degree of enthusiasm for the operation after the study with the degree of 
control exercised in the trial. The data clearly indicate that the less 
well controlled the study the greater is the enthusiasm vested in the 
operation by the investigators. Collateral evidence of this kind,though 
far from compelling,is mildly persuasive of the merits of conducting a 
"fair" trial. 
The Statistici Decemviri gave "robust" advice to clinicians 
endeavoring to design and analyze their own clinical trial on patients 
with a life threatening disease. The first point, and all else essentially 
flowed from it, was to conduct a large trial. But anyone who has the 
resources to embark on such a grand enterprise can certainly afford the 
counsel of a competent statistician on the design and analysis aspects. 
Hence the guidance provided is to a virtually vacuous class of clinicians. 
Further an informed prior stratification on a reasonable number of 
{) 
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prognostic indicators can be of great value in sharpening a comparison, 
when appropriately accounted for in the analysis. 
Apprehensive that an analysis made by clinicians would not appro-
priately take into account design features that had been built into a 
trial the Statistici Decemviri are persuaded to recommend only the 
simplest type of design. Or it was an issue (analysis dependent on the 
design) in which total agreement among them was not possible. Thus, they 
may have preferred to avoid addressing this matter in detail. They only 
intimate that if stratified entry were disregarded and a retrospective 
stratification undertaken, calculated P-values would be conservative. 
Another fact, not ~lways of subordinate import, is that sometimes 
interim analyses are of value in concluding early that some agent is par-
ticularly effective, ineffective,or even deleterious. Lack of prior 
stratification and continual sequential balance could impede such analyses. 
In the best of all possible scientific or "clinical" enterprises one 
brings to bear every relevant bit of information available in the con-
struction of a probability model appropriate to the experiment. Output 
from the trial is transformed into a probability distribution for the 
response of the patients to the agents. Combining this output with a 
utility function (the utility of making a particular decision when a 
specified hypothesis is true) results in a decision as to which agent is 
indicated for a particular group of patients. This is the subjective 
Bayesian decision theoretic approach. However, to fully execute it is 
often such a complex and difficult affair that it boggles the mind. For 
example, aside from the actual modeling difficulties, whose utility is to 
be employed? Is it the patient's, the physician's or society's? These 
are often at odds. 
~·; 
V 
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In the absence of perfection, one must inevitably compromise. Hence, 
the advice of the Statistici Decemviri is sensible as an initial posture 
but significant deviations are in order, if guided by a competent statis-
tician. The use of prior stratification has already been indicated as one 
variation. 
A more radical departure is to refrain from drawing conclusions only on 
the basis of P-values (significance levels) which are antiquated assessments 
for the comparison of agents. P-value analysis should be replaced by the 
Bayes-factor, Good (1967), which is essentially a ratio of predictive densi-
ties, Geisser (1971), also termed relative betting odds by Cornfield (1972). 
When the Bayes-factor is multiplied by the prior odds, posterior odds are 
obtained that one agent is more e:f fective tpan another. An elaborate 
Bayesian edifice need not be constructed to achieve su~n)a result. Methods 
are available which mini~ze the influence of prior subjective information 
u 
that is difficult to model or is vague. The time has also come to couch 
inferences in terms of probabilistic predictions; e.g. as a chance that one 
agent will enhance some measurable response in a patient or group of 
patients by a given number of units with respect to another agent, Geisser. 
(1971). 
To implement such analyses it is necessary to secure the assistance 
of a Bayesian oriented statistician with a predivistic outlook. 
·'I 
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